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By EE NARA Date 4/18/88



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

SECRET/NODIS

December 9, 1975

TO: The Secretary

FROM: S/P - Winston Lord *W*
EA - William H. Gleysteen, Jr. *W*

Your Briefing of the
Congressional Leadership on the Asian Trip

Attached are talking points on the Asian trip, with emphasis on China, for you to draw upon for your briefing of the Congressional leadership tomorrow.

Attachment

Checklist for Briefing Leadership

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December 8, 1975

CHECKLIST FOR BRIEFING LEADERSHIP

1. President's China trip was very successful -- even more than we expected. The mood was good. The atmosphere friendly. The talks frank. We believe the Kissinger trip (which was not as cool as the press alleged) and our subsequent messages to the Chinese about the President's visit (making it an Asian trip and shortening the stay in Peking) helped clear the air. The Chinese gave the President a very courteous welcome and were clearly eager for him to visit.

2. Both sides concluded, as indicated in the President's toast, that our relations are good and will be getting gradually better. The Chinese obviously wanted us to say this while we were in Peking and confirmed it to the press and others. There could be no clearer indication that they considered the visit successful and our relations to be on course.

3. The bulk of the President's discussion with Mao and Teng was on international issues with primary emphasis on the Soviet Union and Europe but also touching on Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

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4. There were many common points, especially opposition to Soviet expansionism wherever it occurs. Once again the Chinese stressed the need for European unity and close US/European relations. They are particularly concerned about the potential for Soviet influence on Europe's southern flank. They support the Arabs in the Middle East but welcome our negotiating role there as serving to reduce Soviet influence. In Asia they stressed again the importance of good, steady U.S. relations with Japan. They continue to state that US/Japanese relations come first; Sino/Japanese relations next. They know that our security ties serve as a check on possible Japanese remilitarism. The Chinese showed wariness toward Hanoi's and New Delhi's designs; and favor -- at least at this stage of world development -- independent states in South and Southeast Asia as the best way to counter Soviet influence. The Soviet role in Angola bothers them as much as it does us, though they claim that they cannot do much in the area.

5. Obviously there were differences too but these were discussed uncontentiously in an atmosphere of agreement to disagree. As before, the Chinese made amply clear that they don't like detente. They would prefer that we --

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and the Europeans and the Japanese -- brawl with the Russians to take pressures off the Chinese. Presumably hoping to wake the West up, they argue that the danger of Soviet attack is considerably greater than we estimate and they assert rather self-servingly that it is directed more at Europe and us than at them. However they seem genuinely concerned about growing Soviet power and European weakness/disunity. The Chinese don't like Europe, Japan, and the U.S. providing credits or technology or grain deals to the Soviet Union. They believe we are helping the Russians precisely in these areas where they are weak. They would like us instead to confront and contain the Russians.

6. The President explained very carefully that our policy of seeking to combine firmness and negotiations is the best way for us to deal with the Soviets. While we seek agreements to reduce tensions, we are prepared to resist expansionism. We have no illusions, borne out by the fact of our heavy defense burdens and our firmness in crises in the past. Although they remain skeptical, and even suspicious of our policy, the Chinese accept the reality that neither they nor the Russians can dictate our policies toward the Soviet Union and China respectively. We emphasized our policies must reflect our situation and our perception of our national interest.

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7. A key factor in US/Chinese relations is the degree of Chinese confidence in the ability of the United States to continue playing an effective world role. The questioning of our strength and resolve was more muted than during Kissinger's trip but is still on the Chinese mind. The President used every opportunity to counter this but only time and our actual behavior will convince the Chinese.

8. We reviewed the Taiwan problem within the framework of the Shanghai Communique. As you know from your own discussions with the Chinese, they insist on the "Japanese model" and their "three principles" (i.e., break relations with Taipei, annul the Taiwan defense treaty, and withdraw all U.S. forces from Taiwan). The President reaffirmed our commitment to normalization but also made clear our position on peaceful settlement. The Chinese, including Mao himself, know it will take time for the normalization process to mature. As of now, they show patience and describe normalization as a problem secondary to the international issues.

9. On more practical bilateral matters, such as trade and exchanges, the President emphasized the direct and indirect value. The Chinese clearly don't envisage major

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changes of pattern at this stage of our relations, but they allow for some improvement achieved largely through normal channels. Their providing the information on MIA's was sensible and timely, far more intelligent than Hanoi's position.

10. The Chinese clearly didn't want to discuss Korea at great length. This came up late and briefly in the talks. While they obviously have their differences with us, they also clearly indicated that they didn't expect a North Korean attack. We believe the Chinese are moderating the North Koreans in this regard; this is their way of telling us they are doing so. They gave no sign of being willing to discuss future arrangements on Korea, while we made clear that we were prepared to talk to North Korea, but only with the South Koreans present.

11. On Indochina the Chinese are clearly cool about Hanoi and its possible pretensions. They did not suggest we improve relations with the Vietnamese and would like us to do so with Cambodia. We said we were open-minded on improving relations with Cambodia and Laos. And both we and the Chinese favor closer Thai/Cambodian relations.

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12. Our relations with China reflect the strategic realities of today, not sentiment. The Chinese are cold-blooded calculators of the geopolitical balance of power around them. We have deep ideological and political differences. But there is a parallelism of our interests in many areas at this stage. Many of our gains from our Chinese relations are intangible, but nonetheless crucial: our greater leverage with Moscow; the reduction of tension and possible miscalculation with China itself; its strong urging of Europe and Japan to stay close to US; its tacit backing of our Mideast role; its restraint of North Korea; its welcoming of a continued strong American role in Asia and the world. Presumably this will continue even as the Chinese grow stronger and more self-confident, but we are under no illusions that China may not present us difficulties over the long term.

13. The President purposely added the stops in Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as his major address in Hawaii, to make this an Asian trip, not just a China trip. Indonesia has the fifth largest population in the world and is rich in natural resources. The Philippines is one of our oldest friends and hosts bases that are crucial to our Asian, indeed global, military posture.

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14. It was only possible to spend a day in each country but our basic purposes were served. The President's visits symbolized this country's continuing interest in the security and prosperity of Asia; no region is of greater interest to us. It underlined the steadiness and growth of the Southeast Asian nations in the wake of the Indochina shocks -- and the fact that our own Asian policy remains essentially intact, thanks to our demonstration of constancy in that region over recent months. The President received very warm welcomes in both places -- indeed the reception in the Philippines was one of the most spectacular in the annals of Presidential trips abroad.

15. In Indonesia we agreed on periodic consultations at the foreign minister-level to review our mutual concern and deepen collaboration. In the Philippines we agreed on a process to review arrangements for our crucial bases; we reaffirmed our acknowledgment of Philippine sovereignty while they made clear that continued U.S. operation of the bases for a long period was in their own interest as well as ours. We are reasonably certain we can find formulas to satisfy understandable Philippine sensitivities without impinging on our operational capabilities.

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